# Tackling the CyberThreatA Global IT SolutionProvider Perspective

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### WHAT ARE WE GOING TO COVER

- Who is SITA?
- Aviation Transport Industry (ATI) threat landscape
- Cyber Threat Intelligence: Type and Sources
- Applying Threat Intel. to the Attacker Lifecycle
- In Conclusion...



# **GLOBAL IT SOLUTIONS & SERVICES PROVIDER TO THE ATI**

### We work with:



Airlines



Ground Handlers

Airports

Air

Control

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Aerospace Traffic

Air



Travel Distribution

### Key facts:

- 400+ Members
- 4,700 staff
- 140 nationalities
- >60 languages ٠
- Nearly every passenger ٠ trip relies on our technology and/or services

### And we're global

Airports – presence

>90% The world's airlines



WE CONNECT air transport industry sites

**Countries and** territories served






# THE THREAT LANDSCAPE



# THREAT LANDSCAPE Aviation is targeted



Motivated, sophisticated and targeted attacks are evident across the expanse of the global air transport industry



# CYBERSECURITY IN THE ATI A Business Issue

- Sophisticated and targeted attacks are evident across the ATI e.g. Airlines, Aircraft Manufacturers, Airports, etc.
- 'Aviation and defence firms are likely to remain top targets of cyber espionage activity' (Mandiant Apr. 16)
- Cybersecurity to remain a Top Management Issue (ACI April 2016)
- Sec. researchers' work points towards increasingly destructive and disruptive attacks
- Cybersecurity related expenditure forecasted to grow 8.3% CAGR through 2020
- Increase interconnectivity within the industry e.g. e-Aircraft, smart airports, IoT augment risks








Leveraging Cyber Threat Intel. to inform response activities



# ADVERSARIES ARE (SMART) PEOPLE NOT SYSTEMS... THEY PURSUE GOALS





# Managing the Threat Leverage Threat Intelligence




- Military-style intelligence applied to cyber
- Government-level 'apparatus'
- Structured
- Years of best practice
- Intelligence reports (mainly) for operational decision making and to inform policy



- Corporate-style IT security approach to threat intel
- Blinky boxes, firewalls, IDS, IR, etc.
- Ad-hoc
- · Inventing practice as we go
- Intelligence reports (mainly) for pretty dashboards to management to justify budget



# Threat intelligence types and Sources



### **OSINT** Open Source Intelligence

- Derived from open sources (e.g. mainstream media, Internet forums, paste sites, etc.
- · Pros: good for 'context' and 'big picture'
- Cons: multiple languages, interpretation, noise

### **TECHINT** Technical Intelligence

- Technical indicators (e.g. IP addresses, hashes, domains, tools & techniques)
- **Pros:** easy to consume and drive automation
- Cons: difficult to 'contextualize'


### **SIGINT** Signals Intelligence

- Derived from analysis of communications, often in one's own environment
- **Pros:** low noise; if you're seeing it, you're experiencing it
- Cons: requires extensive apparatus



# Cyberattack lifecycle

- Describes the stages that an adversary must go through in order to realize their goals against their target(s).
- From defender's point of view, represents the many ways we can disrupt the adversary







- Paste sites and underground forums can be rich sources of information
- Perform your own reconnaissance... what can you find about you?

### TECHINT

- · IP addresses of adversary command-and-control infrastructures
- E-mail addresses of targeted staff members
- Your own external footprint... what's out there vs. what we *thought* was out there?
- Proactively look for vulnerabilities and technical weaknesses

- Target lists of IP addresses, domain names, email addresses, etc. to feed monitoring
- Discover 'rogue' or 'shadow IT' services to determine where security monitoring / response coverage gaps might exist







- Attacker's tools, techniques and procedures (TTPs) may have been reported (semi) publicly
- Security researchers posting proof-of-concept code
- Adversaries sometimes let their code slip!

### TECHINT

- Many attacks leverage known tools... so why not acquire them?
- What fingerprints can identify a tool, or technique?

- Download attacker tools: maybe work with your pentesting team and build detections for common tools (e.g. mimikatz, PowerShell Empire, etc.)
- Proof-of-concept code can help highlight where vulnerability exists... can inform business proactively of need to be vigilant







- Research delivery mechanisms
- Malware reports, reverse engineering write-ups, etc.

### TECHINT

- Malware signatures, hashes
- IP addresses of delivery mechanisms


### SIGINT

- Monitor incoming email
- Enable a reporting mechanism for staff to report malicious email

### **APPLICATIONS**

- Ingest high-confidence intel into defensive controls, like firewalls, IDS/IPS, etc.
- Tune email infrastructure to detect/block known delivery mechanisms

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### TECHINT

- Attacker TTPs
- Malware signatures
- Exploitation fingerprints (e.g. file/registry artifacts, etc.)

### SIGINT

- AV detections
- IDS detections
- SIEM / other monitoring detections

- Malware signatures may enable 'hunting' for other infected systems
- Can initiate Incident Response with information about where to start looking
- Assist in helping to 'scope' the incident







### TECHINT

- IP addresses of command-and-control
- C2 domains
- C2 communications protocol details

### SIGINT

Outbound communication to C2 (e.g. beaconing)

- Create detections for certain C2 traffic patterns
- · Potentially 'spy' on C2 traffic to understand what attackers activity is
- Possible use for blocking & tackling; disrupt C2?
- Further identify scope of a potential incursion







- Attacker data dumps aka 'loot'
- Attempts to sell or fence data (cash out)
- Boasting & bragging


### TECHINT

- Details of exfiltration methods
- Forensic artifacts

### SIGINT

- Attacker 'fingerprints'
- C2 and exfiltration communications

- Credentials of compromised users can alert and take action (e.g. password reset)
- Clearer view of what extent of compromise may be (e.g. data accessed or modified)
- Input to 'remediation activities' to block the attacker







- Uncover persistence mechanisms and approaches (through research)
- Identify C2 infrastructure


### SIGINT

- Compare activity against baseline 'normal'
- Use of common tools, by uncommon users of those tools (e.g. psexec, PowerShell, etc.)

- Pinpoint 'hotspots' to investigate for signs of malicious activity
- Round-out identification of all access mechanisms ready for remediation







### **Overarching goals**:

- support informed decision making; clarify the risk landscape
- prevent or decrease the time to detect an attack
- augment incident response capability; facilitate investigation of an attack
- improve information security management practices



# 3 points in conclusion

The cybersecurity threat is real, co-ordinated and happening now – across all industries

# 2

**Cybersecurity intelligence** can help individual organisations address and respond to threats,

Industry-wide shared intelligence is most helpful to protect our industry



Get involved... share your cyber threat intelligence



